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TITLE 14
CONTRACTORS'BONDS
Chapter
1. Public Contracts.
2. Private Contracts.

CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Section
14-1-1. Repealed.
14-1-1.1. Repealed.
14-1-2 to 14-1-4. Repealed.
14-1-5 to 14-1-12. Repealed.
14-1-13. Performance and payment bonds on
public projects - Conditions
and terms.

14-1-1.
Repeals. -

Repealed.
Section 14-1-1 (L. 1909, ch. 68,

§ 1; 1917, ch. 36, § 2; C.L. 1917, § 3753; R.S.

1933 & C. 1943,

14-1-1.1.

Section
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds.
14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivision failing to obtain bond.
14-1-16. Attorney's fees.
14-1-17. Exemption of entities subject to Procurement Code.

§

to protect mechanics and materialmen, was repealed by Laws 1963, ch. 15, § 6.

17-1-1), providing for bond

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 14-1-1.1 (L. 1953, ch. 23,
1), relating to security in connection with
bids, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 75, § 5.
§

14-1-2 to 14-1-4.

provisions,

see

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 14-1-2 to 14-1-4 (L.
1909, ch. 68, §§ 1, 2; 1917, ch. 36, § 2; C.L.
1917, §§ 3753 to 3755; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
17-1-2 to 17-1-4; L. 1961, ch. 27, § 1), relating

14-1-5 to 14-1-12.

For present
comparable
§ 63-56-1 et seq.

to recovery on bonds to protect mechanics and
materialmen, were repealed by Laws 1963, ch.
15, § 6.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 14-1-5 to 14-1-12 (L.
1963, ch. 15, §§ 1 to 5; 1969, ch. 36, §§ 1 to 3),
relating to bonding of contractors for public

buildings and public works, were repealed by
Laws 1980, ch. 75, § 5. For present comparable
provisions, see § 63-56-1 et seq.
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Performance
and payment bonds
projects - Conditions and terms.

on

public

(1) Before any contract for the construction, alteration or repair of any
public building, public work or public improvement of the state or its political
subdivisions is awarded to any person, that person shall furnish to the appropriate political entity the following bonds:
(a) a performance bond in and amount equal to 100% of the price specified in the contract upon the faithful performance of the contract, solely
for the protection of the political entity awarding the contract; and
(b) a payment bond in an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in
the contract, solely for the protection of persons supplying labor or materials to the contractor or his subcontractors for the performance of work
provided for in the contract.
(2) Each bond shall be:
(a) binding upon the award of the contract to the person;
(b) executed by a surety company or companies duly authorized to do
business in this state;
(c) payable to the appropriate political entity; and
(d) filed in the office of the political entity awarding the contract.
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the
state or its political subdivisions to require additional performance bonds or
other security.
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Liability for failure to exact bond.
Necessity for furnishing bond.
Purpose and construction.

Liability for failure to exact bond.
Failure of a school district to require bond
from contractor did not render it liable to contractor's assignee whose right to money was
subordinate to claims for labor and materials.
South High School Dist. v. McMillan Paper &
Supply Co., 49 Utah 477, 164 P. 1041 (1917);
Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 Utah
493, 164 P. 1047 (1917), applying Laws 1909,
ch. 68.
This section merely required contractor to
execute the bond mentioned therein, but did
not impose the duty upon any particular person to exact such a bond. New York Blower Co.
v. Carbon County High School, 50 Utah 342,
167 P. 670 (1917).
School district was not liable to parties supplying labor and material to construct high
school building for failure to require the bond
mentioned herein. New York Blower Co. v.

Carbon County High School, 50 Utah 342, 167
P. 670 (1917).
School trustees were not personally liable for
failure to require the bond mentioned herein.
New York Blower Co. v. Carbon County High
School, 50 Utah 342, 167 P. 670 (1917).

Necessity for furnishing bond.
Under statute anyone interested could demand that a bond be executed or required, and
thereafter a refusal to do so would be willful.
Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 Utah
493, 164 P. 1047 (1917).
Purpose and construction.
Statute was highly remedial for the benefit
of and to provide security for all persons furnishing labor and materials on public work.
Campbell Bldg. Co. v. District Court of Millard
County, 90 Utah 552, 63 P.2d 255 (1936).
Statute was not for the benefit of the con-
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tractor but for the benefit of the state, the creditors and the surety. State ex rel. McBride v.

14-1-14

Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341
(1938).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative
Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 127.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 43 et seq.; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public
Works and Contracts § 99.
C.J.S. - SIA C.J.S. States § 119.

14-1-14.

Actions

A.L.R. - Duty of public authority to disclose to contractor information, allegedly in its
possession, affecting cost or feasibility of
project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182.
Key Numbers. - States ,s,,, 101.

on payment bonds.

(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract for which a payment bond
is furnished under this chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days
from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was
supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond for any amount
unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue on the contract for the amount
due.
(2) Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but
no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment
bond, shall have a right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written
notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which the last of the
labor was performed or material was supplied. The person shall state in the
notice the amount claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be served
personally or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope
addressed to the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or
conducts business.
(3) Any person may obtain from the appropriate political entity a certified
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and
postage. A certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, execution, and delivery of the original.
(4) Any action instituted on the payment bond shall be brought in the
appropriate court in the political subdivision in which the contract was to be
performed. The action shall be commenced within one one year after the
furnishing of materials or labor, except if the claimant is a subcontractor of
the contractor, the action shall be commenced within one year from the date
on which final payment under the subcontract became due.
History: L. 1983, ch. 61,

§

2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of contract.
Claims of creditors against contractor.
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Last day material furnished.
Lien of laborers or materialmen.
Purpose and construction of act.
Timeliness of notice.

Abandonment of contract.
A contract could not be regarded
doned if its terms and conditions
formed by surety company instead
contractor. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914).

as abanwere perof by the
Bros., 44

Claims of creditors against contractor.
The statute dealt only with actions against
the surety; claims of creditors against the contractor were not affected thereby and could be
asserted at any time within the general statute
of limitations. State ex rel. McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 (1938).
Last day material furnished.
Date on which the last of material was furnished was the delivery date for purposes of
this section and it was not extended by subsequent substitution of new and different controls to correct the supplier's error. A.A.
Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 24
Utah 2d 369, 472 P.2d 424 (1970).
Liens of laborers or materialmen.
Although a workman or materialman could
not acquire a lien on a public building for labor
or material furnished in the construction of
such building in view of § 38-1-1, he might
have a preferential right to money in the
hands of the public corporation to be used in
the construction of the building under this section. Mountain States Supply Co. v. NuttallAllen Co., 63 Utah 384, 225 P. 811 (1924).

Purpose and construction of act.
Former law, insofar as it allowed "any person" supplying labor or materials to sue, was
highly remedial, and was, in furtherance of
justice, to receive a liberal construction and application so as to accomplish its real object and
purpose. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914), applying Comp.
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now repealed.
The purpose of the former statute was to enable creditors of or claimants against contractor on public buildings to collect for work and
materials furnished by them ratably and equitably from contractor and his bondsmen in all
cases to the full amount and extent of the
surety bond. Board of Educ. v. West, 55 Utah
357, 186 P. 114 (1919).
Timeliness of notice.
Materialman having delivered goods to subcontractor of state-owned bridge project could
not hold the prime contractor or surety liable
for payment where he had no contractual relationship with the prime contractor and did not
give ninety-day notice to the contractor; under
the prior law, plaintiff had no action against
the prime contractor or surety because the action was not commenced within one year of the
date of final settlement of the bridge contract
by the state. American Oil Co. v. General Contracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d 330, 411 P.2d 486
(1966).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 114 et seq.

C.J.S. - 81A C.J.S. States § 125.
Key Numbers. - States eao 101.

14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivision failing to
obtain bond.
If the state or one of its political subdivisions fails to obtain a payment bond,
it shall, upon demand by a person who has supplied materials or performed
labor under the applicable contract, promptly make payment to that person,
and the creditor shall have a direct right of action on his account against the
appropriate political entity in any court having jurisdiction in the county in
which the contract was to be performed. The action shall be commenced
within one year after the furnishing of materials or labor.

734

14-2-1

PRIVATE CONTRACTS
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 3.

14-1-16.

Attorney's

fees.

The prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, §

14-1-17.

fees.

4.

Exemption
Code.

of entities

subject

to Procurement

This chapter shall apply only to those political entities not subject to the
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63.
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 5.

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Section
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation of actions.

14-2-1.

Section
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics
and materialmen - Attorney's
fee.
14-2-4. Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees.

Bond to protect mechanics

and materialmen.

The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building,
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment furnished,
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request.
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 1 to ·3; C.L.
1917, §§ 3759 to 3761; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
17-2-1; L. 1977, ch. 56, § 3; 1985, ch. 219, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend-

ment inserted "equipment and materials
rented," after "material furnished" near the
end of the first sentence of the first paragraph
of the section; divided the second sentence into

735

14-2-1

CONTRACTORS'BONDS

the second, third and fourth sentences; substituted "This bond runs" at the beginning of the
second sentence for "Such bond shall run"; deleted "and" after "may appear" to form the
third sentence; inserted "or rented any equipment or" before "materials" in the third sentence; substituted "for which payment" in the
third sentence for "payment for which"; substituted "has" for "shall have"; inserted "for the
reasonable value of the rented materials or
equipment furnished" in the third sentence af-

ter "upon such bond"; substituted "for labor
performed, not exceeding the prices agreed
upon" at the end of the third sentence for
"labor performed, not exceeding, however, in
any case the prices agreed upon; which"; substituted "This right of action accrues 40 days"
in the fourth sentence for "right of action shall
accrue for 40 days"; substituted "This bond" in
the last paragraph for "The bond herein provided for"; and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Acceptance of notes from contractor.
Construction and application.
Contract vendee.
Duty to furnish bond.
Failure of builder to require bond.
Lessee of land.
Leveling of land.
Material becoming a part of realty.
Materialmen supplying subcontractor.
Mechanic's lien law.
One-year statute of limitations.
Performance bond.
Proof of status as materialman.
Purpose of chapter.
Sufficiency of bond.
Terms of bond.
Unlicensed subcontractor.

Constitutionality.
This section is constitutional; it does not infringe the due process clause of the Constitution. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50
Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 1918A L.R.A. 1193
(1917).
Acceptance of notes from contractor.
Materialman
who accepted contractor's
notes for balance due on materials furnished
was estopped from bringing an action against
owners of the construction projects in question,
who had failed to furnish the bonds required by
this section, for the balance that remained due
after the contractor declared bankruptcy. Apex
Lumber Co. v. Comanche Constr. Co., 18 Utah
2d 119, 417 P.2d 131 (1966).
Construction and application.
This chapter protects the laborer and materialman as well as the landowner; it makes no
distinction between resident and nonresident.
King Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d
339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962).
Contract vendee.
Buyer of home under construction who exe-

cuted agreement to purchase home from owner
thereof who was also general contractor for
construction of home was not "owner of any
interest in land" within meaning of statute and
hence was not liable to unpaid materialman;
buyer was, however, liable to unpaid materialman for fixtures added to home which were not
provided for in plans and specifications for the
home and which buyer had specifically requested materialman to install. Harries v.
Valgardson, 19 Utah 2d 433, 432 P.2d 58
(1967).

Duty to furnish bond.
Under this section a bond may be demanded
from the contractor to the lessee to protect lessee and lessor against mechanics' liens.
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., 88 Utah
213, 53 P.2d 1153 (1936).
Failure of builder to require bond.
Where owner-builder failed to require home
contractor to file the bond required by this section, such owner-builder was liable for wages
due the contractor's employees, even though
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such employees had signed releases and lien
waivers for everything to owner-builder when
he paid the employees for only part of their
labor. Pierce v. Pepper, 17 Utah 2d 123, 405
P.2d 345 (1965).

Lessee of land.
Party who entered into contract for construction of lumber curing plant was owner of "interest in land" within meaning of statute, and,
having failed to obtain performance bond as
required by the statute, was liable to materialman upon default of general contractor notwithstanding fact that he was lessee rather
than owner of land. King Bros. v. Utah Dry
Kiln Co., 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968).
Leveling of land.
Work in leveling is not an improvement
upon land requiring the owner to obtain a bond
from the contractor. Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah
2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 (1956).
Material becoming a part of realty.
In order to qualify under this chapter it is
necessary that there be an annexation to the
land, or to some permanent structure upon it,
so that the materials in question can properly
be regarded as having become a part of the
realty, or a fixture appurtenant to it; and this
must be done with the intention of making it a
permanent part thereof. That the addition is
consistent with the use to which the property is
put is often helpful in making the determination. King Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah
2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962).
An action by a materialman against a landowner for reasonable value of materials supplied to a contractor building a dry kiln plant
for defendant, based on defendant's failure to
require contractor to furnish performance
bond, should not have been dismissed without
the taking of evidence to determine whether
such things as a furnace, furnace casing, motorized fans, pipes, and hoods, which often become permanent adjuncts to a building were or
were not so used as to come within the meaning of this section and § 14-2-2. King Bros. v.
Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d
254 (1962).
Aluminum railings and gates installed in a
bank were an "addition to, or alteration or
repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land" affording protection to thirdparty supplier thereof against failure of the
bank to procure a bond from its installing contractor under this section and§ 14-2-2. Metals
Mfg. Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74,
395 P.2d 914 (1964).
Materialmen supplying subcontractor.
Action by materialmen against homeowner
for material supplied subcontractor of bankrupt general contractor was not within purview of the statute where the materialmen

14-2-1

supplied the subcontractor so that the homeowner was not in privity with the materialmen, the homeowner owed nothing to the general contractor and the materialmen extended
credit to the subcontractor. Crown Roofing &
Eng'r Co. v. Robinson, 19 Utah 2d 417, 432
P.2d 47 (1967).

Mechanics' lien law.
Statute is auxiliary to mechanics' lien law
and is just as much in aid of it as if it had been
made a part of it. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 1918A L.R.A.
1193 (1917).
Because of the common purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes (§§ 38-1-1 to 38-1-26)
and contractor's bond statutes (this section and
§ 14-2-2) and their practically identical language, adjudications as to what is lienable under the former are helpful in determining the
proper application of the latter. King Bros. v.
Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d
254 (1962).
One-year statute of limitations.
Cause of action which arose while three-year
statute of limitation was in effect became subject to one-year statute of limitation under
statute as amended as of effective date of the
one-year statute, so that a cause of action arising five and a half months before the effective
date of the one-year statute lapsed seventeen
and a half months later. Day & Night Heating
Co. v. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412, 432 P.2d 43 (1967).
Performance bond.
This section does not require the execution of
a performance bond to assure the owners they
will get what they bargained for in their contract with the general contractor. Lignell v.
Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979).
Proof of status as materialman.
Invoice between plaintiff and installer, reciting that merchandise was purchased for resale,
was not conclusive evidence that plaintiff was
a materialman entitled to the benefits of this
statute. Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8
Utah 2d 413, 335 P.2d 837 (1959).
Purpose of chapter.
Purpose of this statute is to prevent landowners from having their lands improved by
third persons, without becoming personally responsible for reasonable value of materials and
labor. Liberty Coal & Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53
Utah 298, 178 P. 341 (1919).
Sufficiency of bond.
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon contractor's faithful performance of contract and
containing no express provision for payment of
materialmen, was sufficient under this section
to exonerate an owner from liability, and to
sustain the right of the materialmen to sue the
surety, in view of the fact that the contract
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expressly required the contractor to pay for all
labor and materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949), distinguished, 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 (1955).
Where owners of tract of land upon which a
franchised restaurant was built accepted performance bond from the contractor, the obligation of which ran only to them and not to "all
other persons as their interest may appear,"
they were liable for payment of judgment for
materials delivered, even though the contractor had been hired by the restaurant chain and
owners had no privity of contract with him,
since they had dealt directly with the contractor and had supervised payment of subcontractors. Bennett v. Downard, 533 P.2d 1348 (Utah
1975).

Terms of bond.
Where the condition of the bond is that the
surety will indemnify the owner if the contractor fails to pay for material and labor, it is not
such a bond contemplated by this section so as
to allow a direct action by the materialman
against the surety, as it does not promise that
the contractor will pay for the material and
labor. Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix
Indem. Co., 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448
(1955).
Unlicensed subcontractor.
The fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed
will not bar his right to sue on a bond or directly against the owner who fails to require a
bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299
P.2d 837 (1956).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256.
A.L.R. - Effect on compensation of archi-

tect or building contractor of express provision
in private building contract limiting the cost of
the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.
Key Numbers. - Mechanics' Liens <t=>313.

14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation of actions.
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain
such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall
be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed
labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished
or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced within one year
from the last date the last materials were furnished or the labor performed.
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 4, 5; C.L. 1917,
§§ 3762, 3763; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 17-2-2; L.
1965, ch. 24, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Application of statute of limitations.
Construction of terms of bond.
Duty to exact bond ..
Failure of builder to require bond.
Installment payments by debtor-contractor.
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of general contractor.
Prejudgment interest.
Substantial performance.
Sufficiency of bond.
Supplier as materialman.
Unlicensed subcontractor.
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Constitutionality.
This section is constitutional; it does not violate due process. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 1918A L.R.A.
1193 (1917).
Application of statute of limitations.
Since § 14-2-1 imposes a duty upon the
owner of property to require a contractor's
bond, the statute of limitations applies only to
suits involving such bonds, obtained by contractor at the behest of the owner; thus where a
general contractor required a subcontractor to
furnish a bond to protect himself and materialmen, the applicable statute of limitations in a
suit by an unpaid
materialman
was
§ 78-12-23, and this section did not apply. Arnold Mach. Co. v. Prince, 550 P.2d 193 (Utah
1976).
Construction of terms of bond.
Terms of a bond which attempted to restrict
period for commencement of an action on the
bond to ninety days was regarded as surplusage and the one-year period in this section was
applicable. Oscar E. Chytraus Co. v. Wasatch
Furnace & Elec., Inc., 28 Utah 2d 339, 502 P.2d
554 (1972).
Duty to exact bond.
Where agreement between a son who owned
real property and his father required the latter
to construct a dwelling upon the land of the
son, and provided that the father would pay
the cost of constructing the house, the son had
a duty to require the father to execute the bond
but, in absence of securing such bond, he was
liable for value of materials. Liberty Coal &
Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 P. 341
(1919).
Failure of builder to require bond.
Property owner who failed to obtain bond
was liable to a materialman for materials furnished to a contractor erecting block walls for
the property owner, even though the owner, at
the time of payment for materials used by himself when he completed construction of the
building, received a release of all claims from
the materialman. Roberts Inv. Co. v. Gibbons
& Reed Concrete Prods. Co., 22 Utah 2d 105,
449 P.2d 116 (1969).
Failure by and owner to procure required
bond from a general contractor does not result
in absolute liability upon the contractor's default; where the owner had paid the general
contractor all sums owing in reliance on lien
waivers signed by the subcontractor acknowledging receipt of payment not in fact received,
there was an issue of material fact as to the
rights of the parties when the subcontractor
sought payment from the owner upon the general contractor's insolvency. J.P. Koch, Inc. v.
J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975).

14-2-2

Installment payments by debtor-contractor.
The lower court erred in granting summary
judgment to a materialman where it appeared
from the pleadings that the contractor owed
the materialman a large sum for several contracting jobs and was paying off the materialman by furnishing him sand and where it was
not clear whether the credit given the contractor's account for such sand deliveries had applied to the materials used in the project.
Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Paulos Auto Co., 17
Utah 2d 402, 413 P.2d 596 (1966).
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of
general contractor.
Where general contractor, employed to construct a house was not required to produce a
surety bond and the owner's mortgagee paid
such general contractor his full compensation
knowing that the general contractor had not
paid materialmen and laborers, the owner of
the project was liable to materialmen and laborers not paid by the general contractor and
the mortgagee, joined by the owner as a thirdparty defendant, was liable to the owner for an
identical amount. Home Elec. Corp. v. Russell,
17 Utah 2d 276, 409 P.2d 388 (1965).
Prejudgment interest.
Where a contractor defaulted on payment to
a materialman, and the materialman obtained
judgment against the owner because of the
owner's failure to furnish a bond to protect the
materialman, the materialman was entitled to
prejudgment interest from the date of first notice to the owner for demand of payment, and
not from the due date indicated on the invoice,
where at time the debt was due, credit was
being extended to the contractor by the materialman for already past-due debts. Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298
(Utah 1982).
Substantial performance.
Doctrine of substantial performance is applicable to this bonding statute; where a heating
subcontract was substantially completed on
December 23, 1968, the fact that one minor
item, a register representing .0011385 percent
of the value of the subcontract, was not furnished until February 19, 1969 does not extend
the limitation period for filing action on bond.
Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 P.2d 60
(1973).
Sufficiency of bond.
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon contractor's faithful performance of contract, and
containing no express provision for payment of
materialmen, was sufficient under this section
to exonerate an owner from liability, and to
sustain right ofmaterialmen to sue the surety,
in view of the fact that the contract expressly
required the contractor to pay for all labor and
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materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116
Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949), distinguished,
Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix Indem.
Co., 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 (1955).

Supplier as materialman.
Supplier was a materialman entitled to recovery under this section in view of evidence
establishing that materials were delivered to a
plumbing subcontractor for a specific job
rather than on open account and that the supplier's records enabled it to identify the con-

tract job to which it delivered the materials
and separate those materials from the subcontractor's other purchases. Lawson Supply Co.
v. General Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 27 Utah
2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972).

Unlicensed subcontractor.
Fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed will
not bar his right to sue on a bond or directly
against the owner who fails to require a bond.
Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299 P.2d 837
(1937).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 1 et seq.

14-2-3.

C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256.
Key Numbers. - Mechanics' Liens e,, 313.

Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen - Attorney's fee.

In any action brought upon the bond provided for under this chapter the
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
History: C. 1953, 14-2-3, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 16, § [1].
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action on contract.
Performance bond.
Recovery of attorney fee.

Action on contract.
This section provides no authority to award
attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action on the construction contract between the
owners and the general contractor. Lignell v.
Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979).
Performance bond.
This section provides no authority to award
attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action between owners and surety on a performance bond not required by this chapter.
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979).

Recovery of attorney fee.
Materialman, entitled to recover the value of
materials furnished contractor in a suit
against the owner of the property for the
owner's failure to obtain a bond, was not entitled to recover attorney's fees in the action because the statute did not provide for an attorney's fee in the event that a bond was not supplied. Roberts Inv. Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Prods. Co., 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P.2d 116
(1969).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. -17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 135.
A.L.R. - Construction of attorney's fees

provision in contractor's
1438.
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14-2-4.

Exceptions

-

Mortgagees,

beneficiaries,

14-2-4

trustees.

Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a mortgage or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust to obtain the bond described in§ 14-2-1,
or imposes any liability upon a mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not
obtained such a bond.
History: C. 1953, 14-2-4, enacted
1986, ch. 207, § 1.

by L.
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